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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself as a patient. You go into the hospital for your
annual physical examination with Dr. Mosley, and you ask him
about an unusual mole that has formed on your abdomen. Dr.
Mosley does a screening and within a short period of time
diagnoses the mole as benign and tells you “not to worry about it.”
You let out a sigh of relief and return to your regular life. About
thirteen months later you attend your annual physical examination
as scheduled, but this time with Dr. Shea because Dr. Mosley has
retired. Dr. Shea analyzes your mole and after running a gamut of
tests determines the mole is cancerous and has metastasized into
Stage IV melanoma. You start treatment immediately, but the
outlook is not promising. Your specialist determined that if Dr.
Mosley had diagnosed your mole as cancerous a year earlier, you
would have had Stage II melanoma with a seventy percent recovery
rate. However, because of the late diagnosis, you instead face a
bleak thirty percent chance of surviving your illness. This lapse of
time equates to a forty percent difference in your chance of
survival.
Under the traditional principles of medical malpractice, you
would be unable to prevail against Dr. Mosley for his misdiagnosis
and your corresponding loss of chance, because you have less than
1
a fifty percent chance of surviving your illness. For a patient to
bring a successful medical malpractice claim, he or she must prove
that the physician’s negligence more likely than not caused the
2
injury. If a patient’s chance of survival has fallen below fifty
percent, he or she is left unable to prove that the physician’s

1. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1993) (holding an
increased chance of recurrence of cancer and a decreased chance of survival were
inactionable injuries).
2. 4A MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY
INSTRUCTION GUIDES-CIVIL § 80.90 (5th ed. 2006).
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negligence, and not the patient’s underlying disease, caused the
3
patient’s injury or death. Thus, under the traditional malpractice
rule, physicians were provided with a virtual shield when it came to
4
patients with less than a fifty percent chance of survival.
The Minnesota Supreme Court sought to remedy these harsh
and illogical results by establishing the loss of chance doctrine in
5
Dickhoff v. Green. Through the adoption of this doctrine, the
arbitrary distinction made between patients with more than a fifty
percent chance of survival and patients with less than a fifty percent
6
chance of survival was eliminated. Plaintiffs are now able to recover
under the loss of chance doctrine so long as the defendant’s
7
malpractice reduced the plaintiff’s chances of survival.
Despite the logical benefits of this doctrine, many questions
remain unanswered regarding the practical application of the loss
of chance doctrine. The Minnesota Supreme Court described loss
of chance in broad terms and did not define what type of provider
8
negligence constitutes a loss of chance claim. The scenarios for
which a provider could be found liable under the loss of chance
theory could include negligently diagnosing, referring, treating,
prescribing, or similar actions, and there is speculation that the loss
of chance doctrine may be expanded beyond the medical
9
malpractice arena. Questions also remain regarding how damages
will be calculated, how the jury will be instructed, and what
implications may be in store for Frye-Mack challenges to experts’
10
quantifications of a patient’s loss of chance. The defense bar is

3. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 333 (Minn. 2013).
4. Id. (quoting McMackin v. Johnson Cnty. Healthcare Ctr., 73 P.3d 1094,
1099 (Wyo. 2003)).
5. Id. at 333, 337.
6. See id.
7. Id. at 338. Because the harm in a loss of chance case is the loss of chance
of survival, it is also interesting to note that under Dickhoff, a patient would likely
succeed on a loss of chance claim even if she had a forty percent chance of
recovery from her disease, which fell to ten percent due to her doctor’s
malpractice.
8. Sarah E. Bushnell, Loss of Chance: New Medical Malpractice Risk in
Minnesota, BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2013, at 18, 21, available at http://mnbenchbar
.com/2013/11/loss-of-chance (“The court’s description is fairly broad: ‘a
physician harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or
survival and should be liable for the value of that chance.’”).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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also concerned that Minnesota’s adoption of loss of chance will
lead to more claims against medical providers, which would
increase the amount of malpractice insurance premiums and the
11
cost of medical treatment to patients. Although Dickhoff v. Green
could usher in expansive changes to medical malpractice lawsuits,
this note seeks to address only the lingering questions surrounding
the loss of chance doctrine as it may be applied to Minnesota’s
wrongful death statute.
In analyzing and attempting to resolve the conflict between
the loss of chance doctrine and Minnesota’s wrongful death statute,
12
this note will examine the history of the wrongful death statute,
13
how the statute is applied today, and the supporting policy
14
15
rationales. It will then analyze the Dickhoff decision and discuss
the implications of the loss of chance doctrine within the current
legal framework. This note concludes by presenting various options
that other states have adopted to align the loss of chance doctrine
16
with the wrongful death statute, and recommends that the
Minnesota legislature amend the wrongful death statute to
17
explicitly provide for the loss of chance doctrine.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
A.

The General Development of Wrongful Death Actions

Wrongful death actions in the common law have a
18
complicated history. The first wrinkle began with the seminal
English case Baker v. Bolton, which proclaimed, “In a Civil Court,
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an
19
injury.” The courts in the United States had a mixed reaction to
this opinion—some states directly admonished the opinion, while

11. Id.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See generally Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1043 (1965) (discussing the history of wrongful death actions in England and
the United States).
19. Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.) 1033; 1 Camp. 493,
493–94.
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20

others adopted its reasoning. The states that retained wrongful
death actions at common law focused the recovery on the loss of
services and allowed third parties with an interest in the life of the
decedent to bring an action exclusively for the loss of the
21
decedent’s services.
By the mid-nineteenth century, the question of whether there
was a common law action for wrongful death became a contested
issue in most jurisdictions, including those jurisdictions previously
22
allowing wrongful death actions. This uncertainty, propelled by an
increase in the frequency of accidents in the growing industrial
economy, prompted state legislatures to take action and enact
23
wrongful death statutes. The state of Massachusetts was the first to
24
enact a wrongful death statute in 1840. This statute created a
quasi-criminal remedy, which allowed the “widows and heirs” of a
passenger killed by the negligence of a common carrier to collect a
25
sum of money charged to the common carrier. Six years later, the

20. See John Fabian Witt, From Loss of Services to Loss of Support: The Wrongful
Death Statutes, the Origins of Modern Tort Law, and the Making of the Nineteenth-Century
Family, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 717, 731–32 (2000). But see Malone, supra note 18,
at 1066–67 (arguing Baker v. Bolton was largely ignored in the United States until
1848).
21. See, e.g., Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 891, 892 (C.C.D. Me. 1827)
(No. 11,233) (holding father could sue for the loss of services of his son); Shields
v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 349–50 (1854) (holding father could recover for death of his
minor son brought after son died in a railroad accident); Ford v. Monroe, 20
Wend. 210, 210 (N.Y. 1838) (holding father could sue for loss of services of his
ten-year-old son after son died in a carriage accident); Lynch v. Davis, 12 How.
Pr. 323, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855) (holding a husband could bring an action against
a doctor for the death of his wife).
22. Witt, supra note 20, at 733; see, e.g., Plummer, 19 F. Cas. at 895–96 (holding
a father can sue for the wages earned by his minor son who was killed by abusive
superiors and overwork during a maritime voyage); Shields, 15 Ga. at 353–357
(discussing when a wrongful death action should be allowed to proceed); Carey v.
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 477–80 (1848), overruled in part by Gaudette
v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972) (holding there is no common law
wrongful death action and it is for the legislature to authorize such a claim).
23. Witt, supra note 20, at 733; see also Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry., 38
Vt. 294, 301 (1865) (“In view of the numerous deaths resulting from wrongful
acts . . . and of the consequent deprivation suffered by the wife and
children . . . for which injury neither the common law, nor existing statutes had
provided a remedy, our legislature in 1849 passed [a wrongful death statute].”).
24. Act of Mar. 23, 1840, ch. 80, 1840 Mass. Acts 224.
25. Id. The Act stated:
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English Parliament enacted a wrongful death statute referred to as
26
Lord Campbell’s Act. This Act established what would become the
basis of many wrongful death statutes in the United States,
27
including Minnesota.
Lord Campbell’s Act codified the idea that a remedy in tort
28
“dies with the person, unless statutory law makes an exception.”
The purpose of limiting a claimant’s ability to recover in a wrongful
29
death action is twofold. First, it is based on the idea that the law
30
provides a remedy only for harms that affect one’s legal rights.
Because a person does not have a legal right to the life of his or her
family members, it is thought there is no legal obligation to
31
pursue. Second, as a practical matter, it is difficult, if not
32
impossible, to determine the value of a human life. These
rationales similarly justified the common law view that wrongful
33
death actions were not actionable.

If the life of any person, being a passenger, shall be lost by reason of
the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor or proprietors of any
rail-road, steam-boat, stage coach, or of common carriers of
passengers, or by the unfitness or gross negligence or carelessness of
their servants or agents, in this Commonwealth, such proprietor or
proprietors, and common carriers, shall be liable to a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars . . . for the benefit of his widow and
heirs . . . .
Id.
26. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1–2 (Eng.) [hereinafter
Lord Campbell’s Act], reprinted in 17 HALSBURY’S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 4 (2d ed.
1950).
27. Compare MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012) (“A cause of action arising out of an
injury to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists,
except as provided in section 573.02.”), and id. § 573.02 (stating that when death is
caused by a wrongful act, an appointed trustee may maintain an action for an
injury caused by the wrongful act, so long as the decedent might have maintained
an action had the decedent lived), with Lord Campbell’s Act, supra note 26
(stating a wrongful death action can be brought when the death of a person is
caused by a wrongful act that would have entitled the injured party to maintain an
action if the person had survived).
28. 1 THOMAS BEVEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAW 180 (3d ed. 1908).
29. At common law, these rationales were also used to justify not recognizing
wrongful death actions. See id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Carey v. Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475, 480 (1848) (holding
that in the absence of a statutory provision, an action cannot be maintained for
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However, Lord Campbell’s Act provided the “exception” for
when a person could sue for the wrongful death of his or her family
34
members. It provided that when the death of a person was
“caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or
default is such as would (if the death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action,” then a wrongful death
35
action could be brought. Recovery under these actions was limited
to “the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person whose death
shall have been so caused,” and the action had to be brought to
court “by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the
36
person deceased.” The purpose of this Act was to address the
inequity that existed at common law––where an action could not be
maintained for wrongful death but was permitted for a personal
37
injury claim if the actor survived. Therefore, prior to Lord
Campbell’s Act, it was a legal windfall to the tortfeasor if the
38
injured victim died from the injuries he or she sustained.
Importantly, at least initially following Lord Campbell’s Act,
courts allowed plaintiffs to collect not only for pecuniary losses
incurred by the decedent’s death, but also for the pain and
39
suffering of the decedent. However, the next of kin could not
40
recover for their own feelings of sorrow or remorse.
B.

The Development of Wrongful Death Actions in Minnesota

Minnesota’s first wrongful death statute was enacted in 1851
41
while Minnesota was still a territory. Minnesota’s statute began by
stating the expression implicit in Lord Campbell’s Act: “A cause of
action arising out of an injury to the person, dies with the person of

the wrongful death of another), overruled in part by Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d
222 (Mass. 1972).
34. See Lord Campbell’s Act, supra note 26.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961).
38. Id.
39. BEVEN, supra note 28, at 183.
40. Id.
41. Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) ch. 78, §§ 1–3 (1851); see also Cashman v.
Hedberg, 215 Minn. 463, 466, 10 N.W.2d 388, 390 (1943) (holding the wrongful
death statute is in derogation of the common law and establishing a new cause of
action).
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either party, except as provided [in the applicable statutory
42
provision].” In pertinent part, the statute provided:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representatives of the
former, may maintain an action against the latter, if the
former might have maintained an action, had he lived,
against the latter, for an injury caused by the same act or
43
omission . . . .
By stating the plaintiff may maintain an action if the decedent
“might have maintained an action, had he lived,” the statute seems
to imply that the plaintiff may recover the same damages the
44
decedent would have been able to collect. However, this is not
how the courts interpreted the statute. Instead, the courts
interpreted the statute as allowing recovery for only the pecuniary
45
losses suffered by the next of kin.
In 1905, the wrongful death statute was revised to incorporate
46
these limitations on the next of kin’s recovery :
The damages awarded must be solely by way of
compensation for pecuniary loss. Punitive damages are
not allowed. No compensation can be awarded for
wounded feelings, for the loss of the companionship and
comfort of the deceased or for his pain and suffering. The
true test is, what, in view of all the facts in evidence, was
the probable pecuniary interest of the beneficiaries in the
continuance of the life of the deceased? The proper
estimate may be arrived at by taking into account the
calling of the deceased and the income derived

42. Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) ch. 78, § 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see BEVEN, supra note 28, at 183.
45. Gunderson v. Nw. Elevator Co., 47 Minn. 161, 164, 49 N.W. 694, 695
(1891) (holding damages in a wrongful death action “relate wholly to the
pecuniary injury suffered by the next of kin” and cannot include recovery for
“injured feelings[] or a solatium”); Opsahl v. Judd, 30 Minn. 126, 128, 14
N.W. 575, 575 (1883) (focusing on decedent’s ability to provide future pecuniary
benefit to next of kin had he lived).
46. REVISED LAWS MINNESOTA 1905, § 4503, at 961 (Mark B. Dunnell ed.,
1906) (“When death is caused by a wrongful act or omission of any person or
corporation, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain an action
therefor if he might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury caused
by the same act or omission.”).
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therefrom, his health, age, probable duration of life,
talents, habits of industry, success in life in the past and
the amount of aid in money or services which he was
47
accustomed to furnish the beneficiaries.
The statute also provided an additional avenue for damages if the
deceased was the “head of the family”:
If the deceased was the head of a family the value of his
services to the family cannot be limited in a pecuniary
sense to the amount of his daily wages earned for their
support. His constant daily services, attention, and care in
their behalf, in the relation which he sustained to them,
48
may be considered as well . . . .
While the damages allowed under the 1905 statute seem
somewhat expansive, the legislature limited a wrongful death claim
49
under the statute to $5000. The next substantial revision to
50
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute occurred in 1951 when the
legislature again amended the type of damages a claimant could
51
recover. The statute as amended stated: “The recovery in [a
wrongful death] action in such an amount as the jury may deem
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss, resulting from such
death, shall not exceed $17,500, and shall be for the exclusive
52
benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin . . . .” This revision
again limited the scope of a wrongful death claim by removing the
language regarding the “head of household” damages and
53
reinstated that a claimant could only recover pecuniary damages.
In 1983, the legislature removed the cap on recovery and
opened the door for claimants to recover punitive damages in
54
appropriate cases. This amendment was important because it
significantly increased a plaintiff’s potential recovery under the

47. Id. § 4503, subdiv. 16, at 962.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 4503, at 961.
50. Minnesota’s wrongful death statute was amended in 1911 and 1935,
which increased the cap on wrongful death damages to $7500 and $10,000,
respectively. Act of Apr. 19, 1911, ch. 281, § 4503, 1911 Minn. Laws 395; Act of
July 1, 1935, ch. 325, § 1, 9657, 1935 Minn. Laws 596.
51. Act of Apr. 23, 1951, ch. 697, § 1, 1951 Minn. Laws 1215.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 347, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws 2397, 2398 (“Punitive
damages may be awarded as provided in section 549.20.”).
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statute, as it went from allowing plaintiffs to recover only for
pecuniary losses in the amount of $35,000 or less, to removing the
cap on damages and allowing for the recovery of punitive
55
damages. In addition, the legislature’s amendment divided the
56
provisions and expanded the scope of the statute to reflect the
57
structure of the present wrongful death statute.
III. MINNESOTA’S WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
A.

What Is Necessary to Bring a Wrongful Death Claim Today?

Today, a wrongful death claim is still a creature of statute and
a reflection of Lord Campbell’s Act. Minnesota Statutes section
573.01 states:
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person
dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists,
except as provided in section 573.02. All other causes of
action by one against another, whether arising on
contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of
58
the former and against those of the latter.
In other words, unless the exception listed in Minnesota Statutes
59
section 573.02 applies, the cause of action dies with the plaintiff.
In pertinent part, Minnesota Statutes section 573.02 provides:
When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
any person or corporation, the trustee . . . may maintain
an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained
an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by
60
the wrongful act or omission.

55. See id.
56. Under this revision, the statute made reference to the damages that are
recoverable after murder or professional negligence. See id.
57. See id. (paralleling the current wrongful death statute through use of
nearly identical language and structure).
58. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012).
59. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Gavenda, 590 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1999) (“A
wrongful death claim is purely statutory, as common law recognized no such
actions on the theory that a claim for personal injuries died with the victim.”);
Fussner v. Andert, 261 Minn. 347, 350, 113 N.W.2d 355, 357 (1961) (“At common
law a civil action for wrongful death was not permitted . . . . It was, therefore, to
the wrongdoer’s financial interest if his injured victim died.”).
60. MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1.
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This section further provides that damages are limited in a
wrongful death claim. With reference to damages the statute
specifically states:
The recovery in the action is the amount the jury deems
fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse and next of kin, proportionate to the
61
pecuniary loss severally suffered by the death.
Taken together, the present wrongful death statute in
Minnesota requires a party to establish four elements to recover:
(1) a proper appointment of a trustee pursuant to Minnesota
62
Statutes section 573.02, subdivision 3; (2) the fact of death;
(3) caused by the wrongful act of the defendant; and (4) causing
63
64
pecuniary loss to a surviving spouse or next of kin.
B.

What Types of Damages Are Recoverable Under Minnesota’s Wrongful
Death Statute?

While the wrongful death statute is written only in terms of
pecuniary damages, Minnesota courts have expanded the
definition of “pecuniary loss” to apply not only actual loss of
income, contributions, and services, but also to include the loss of
advice, comfort, and protection the decedent may have provided to
65
his or her family. As statutory revisions and case law have
61. Id.
62. The appointed trustee for a wrongful death action is usually the family
member who filed the wrongful death statute. However, the statute dictates:
Upon written petition by the surviving spouse or one of the next of kin,
the court having jurisdiction of an action falling within the provisions
of subdivisions 1 or 2, shall appoint a suitable and competent person as
trustee to commence or continue such action and obtain recovery of
damages therein. The trustee, before commencing duties shall file a
consent and oath. Before receiving any money, the trustee shall file a
bond as security therefor in such form and with such sureties as the
court may require.
Id. § 573.02, subdiv. 3.
63. Pecuniary loss is defined as “[a] loss of money or of something having
monetary value.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1030 (9th ed. 2009). But see Fussner,
261 Minn. at 359, 113 N.W.2d at 363 (holding “pecuniary loss” as described in
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute is not limited to a loss of income).
64. 28A DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: ELEMENTS OF AN ACTION § 22:1
(2014).
65. Fussner, 261 Minn. at 360, 113 N.W.2d at 363; see also Rath v. Hamilton
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highlighted, the law seems to reflect a growing appreciation of the
intangible value in family relationships, which is why the law allows
family members to recover damages not just for the loss of services
that the decedent family member could have provided, but also for
the aid, comfort, and assistance that could have been derived from
66
a continued relationship with the decedent.
However, it is important to note that there can be no recovery
by the surviving family members under a wrongful death action for
the pain and suffering of the decedent or for grief or sorrow of the
67
family members. This black letter rule of law is a reflection of the
purpose of the present-day wrongful death statute––that of
compensating surviving spouses and next-of-kin for the monetary
68
value of lost support, services, and property. The emphasis of a
wrongful death action is on the losses the decedent’s family
suffered as a result of the decedent’s death; family members are
69
unable to recover for losses that were distinctly the decedent’s.
Accordingly, all necessary funeral, hospital, and medical
expenses are recoverable by the decedent’s heirs because this is

Standard Div. of United Techs. Corp., 292 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. 1980)
(explaining pecuniary loss not limited to income loss); Cummins v. Rachner,
257 N.W.2d 808, 815 (Minn. 1977) (stating jury should consider loss of counsel,
guidance, advice, comfort, assistance, and protection decedent would have given
children had decedent lived); McCorkell v. City of Northfield, 272 Minn. 24, 30,
136 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1965) (holding damages for potential support of children
may be awarded even if children were adults).
66. See Cummins, 257 N.W.2d at 815 (stating pecuniary loss to the decedent’s
family is measured against achievements of the deceased and her daily
contributions to the family).
67. See Hutchins v. St. Paul, M&M Ry., 44 Minn. 5, 9, 46 N.W. 79, 80–81
(1890) (holding wrongful death actions are distinguishable from personal injury
actions, which allow a plaintiff to collect for pain and suffering because the next of
kin cannot receive compensation for the decedent’s pain and suffering or their
feelings of sorrow); see, e.g., Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 829 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding father of decedent could not recover for emotional distress
or suffering in wrongful death action).
68. 27 MICHAEL K. STEENSON ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW § 13.13 (2013 ed.) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 573.01, subdiv. 1 (2012)).
69. Id. The most illustrative example of this type of loss is pain and suffering.
In a personal injury action the person who underwent this pain and suffering is
bringing the action and therefore can recover for this loss. However, if this
plaintiff were to die while bringing this claim, the claim is transitioned into a
statutory wrongful death claim, and recovery for pain and suffering is no longer a
proper measure of damages.
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money that would otherwise have to come out of the decedent’s
70
71
estate. As noted above, a fairly recent change to the wrongful
death statute allows for heirs to recover punitive damages in a
72
wrongful death action. The Minnesota legislature made this
amendment in 1983, and it significantly expanded an area of
73
damages where courts had not previously allowed recovery.
In sum, surviving family members may recover for loss of
income, contributions, services, advice, comfort, and protection
74
under Minnesota’s wrongful death statute. They may also recover
for the decedent’s medical expenses and funeral costs, but they are
unable to recover for the pain and suffering the decedent
75
experienced from the defendant’s negligence. According to
Minnesota’s present wrongful death statute, this type of claim dies
76
with the decedent.
IV. THE DICKHOFF V. GREEN DECISION
A.

Introduction to the Significance of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful
Death Actions in Minnesota

At the end of May 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued
an opinion that will have lasting implications for medical
77
malpractice law in Minnesota. In Dickhoff, the court recognized
the loss of chance doctrine for the first time in Minnesota history.
While twenty-one states across the country and the District of
Columbia already recognize loss of chance and have been applying
78
the law for a number of years in their own states, the doctrine
70. Prescott v. Swanson, 197 Minn. 325, 339, 267 N.W. 251, 258–59 (1936).
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1 (“Punitive damages may be awarded as
provided in [Minnesota Statutes] section 549.20.”). Minnesota Statutes section
549.20 provides that punitive damages are recoverable “upon clear and convincing
evidence that the acts of the defendant show deliberate disregard for the rights or
safety of others.” Id. § 549.20, subdiv. 1.
73. See, e.g., Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226,
228 (Minn. 1982) (denying punitive damages in wrongful death action).
74. 27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68, § 13.13.
75. Tiedeken v. Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228 (“A wrongful death claim, unlike a claim for
personal injuries, does not include compensation for pain and suffering.”)).
76. See MINN. STAT. §§ 573.01, 573.02, subdiv. 1.
77. 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013).
78. Id. at 334 n.12 (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 10

1556

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:4

presents a novel question in Minnesota because of our unique
wrongful death statute. As this note explained in Part III,
Minnesota law forecloses recovery to claimants for any damages
that were suffered solely by the decedent, for example, for pain and
suffering damages. And as delineated by Minnesota Statutes
section 573.01, this type of personal injury claim dies with the
79
decedent.
Therefore, in the wake of the Dickhoff decision, vital questions
remain open and unanswered: Will loss of chance claims be
available to plaintiffs through the wrongful death statute? Will
damages for loss of chance be measured in terms of personal injury
(including pain and suffering damages), or will damages be
measured in terms of traditional wrongful death damages
(pecuniary loss to the next of kin)? And, what implications might
this have for Minnesota’s wrongful death statute? In the sections
that follow, this note will provide insight into the Dickhoff decision
and will then explore the case law developed in other states to
understand how these questions may be addressed.
B.

Facts and Procedure

Jocelyn Dickhoff was a newborn when her parents, Joseph and
80
Kayla Dickhoff, observed a lump on her backside. Her parents
(Plaintiffs) testified they immediately brought the lump to their
81
pediatrician’s attention at Jocelyn’s two-week appointment. At this
time the lump was pea-sized and Dr. Tollefsrud told the Dickhoffs
82
she would “keep an eye on it.” Despite this assurance, it was not
until after their daughter’s one-year examination that the lump’s
growth was properly assessed by Jocelyn’s pediatrician and
83
diagnosed as a cancerous tumor. The time that had elapsed
between her two-week check-up and her one-year examination was
84
significant because the disease had advanced and metastasized.

(Mass. 2008)).
79. MINN. STAT. § 573.01; see also Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d at 910–11.
80. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 324.
81. Id. at 325.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Following her diagnosis, Jocelyn began an intense course of
85
treatment, consisting of chemotherapy, surgery, and radiation.
On April 6, 2009, Plaintiffs commenced a medical malpractice
86
action against Jocelyn’s physician and the hospital (Defendants).
Plaintiffs’ experts indicated that the delay in Jocelyn’s diagnosis
took her from a sixty percent chance of surviving her disease to a
87
forty percent chance of survival. Stated differently, Jocelyn went
from likely surviving her cancer to probably dying from it due to
her doctor’s negligence in failing to diagnose her cancer or refer
88
her to a specialist. Therefore, Plaintiffs sought
compensation for (1) the cost of medical treatment
related to the 2010 recurrence of Jocelyn’s cancer, as well
as pain and suffering that Jocelyn experienced as a result
of that treatment; and (2) Jocelyn’s decreased chance of
surviving the cancer in the future
and the probability that
89
she will die from the disease.
The district court ruled Plaintiffs could not recover for
Jocelyn’s past medical expenses because she would have received
90
even in the absence of
essentially the same treatments
91
Defendants’ negligence.
Defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion, concluding
Plaintiffs’ claim to recover for “reduced life expectancy and
increased risk of reoccurrence” was essentially a loss of chance
92
claim and was not recognized in Minnesota.
Plaintiffs appealed and the court of appeals reversed the
93
district court. Here it became important that Plaintiffs framed
their claim as one for improbable survival instead of as one for a
94
loss of chance. Plaintiffs likely chose to frame their case as one as

85. Id.
86. Id. at 326.
87. Id. at 326.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 338 (Dietzen, J., dissenting).
90. Plaintiffs conceded that Jocelyn would have received chemotherapy,
surgery, and radiation even without Defendants’ negligence. Id. at 327 (majority
opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 328.
94. See id.
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improbable survival instead of loss of chance because of the
95
Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Fabio v. Bellomo.
In Fabio, the Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with a
similar fact pattern: the plaintiff had two physical examinations by
her physician in which her physician discovered a lump in the
96
plaintiff’s breast. He told the plaintiff that the lump was a fibrous
97
mass and “not to worry about it.” Upon an examination by
another doctor, a biopsy was ordered and it was discovered plaintiff
98
had two tumors and her cancer had metastasized. The plaintiff
argued that the defendant’s negligence created a reduced chance
of survival and an increased chance of reoccurrence of cancer
because he misdiagnosed and failed to promptly treat the mass in
99
the plaintiff’s breast. In Fabio, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized this as a loss of chance argument and declined to adopt
100
it as a new cause of action.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals was persuaded by Plaintiffs’
distinction between loss of chance and improbable recovery, and
ruled Plaintiffs’ arguments amounted to a claim for medical
malpractice and did not constitute an inactionable loss of chance
101
claim. However, despite Plaintiffs’ carefully phrased arguments,
the supreme court labeled the action as one of loss of chance and
analyzed the case within that context.

95. 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993).
96. Id. at 760.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 762.
100. Id. (“We have never recognized loss of chance in the context of a medical
malpractice action, and we decline to recognize it in this case.”).
101. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 811 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn. Ct. App.
2012), aff’d, 836 N.W.2d 321(Minn. 2013).
We believe that the supreme court did not intend to completely
foreclose the possibility of malpractice actions for negligent cancermisdiagnosis cases involving a lengthy illness with a potentially fatal
outcome. Instead, we read the caselaw only to limit those actions to
circumstances in which it has become more probable than not that the
patient will not survive the cancer.
Id. (citing MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 711, 722 (Minn. 2008)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/10

16

Biermann: The Practical Effects of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful Death Acti

2014]

C.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DICKHOFF V. GREEN

1559

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court distinguished
Dickhoff from Fabio and recognized loss of chance as an actionable
102
doctrine under Minnesota law. The loss of chance doctrine allows
recovery when a physician’s negligence causes a reduction in the
103
patient’s chance to survive or recover from his or her illness. The
court also decided a patient can successfully sue his or her
physician for an increased risk of not recovering from the
underlying illness and for a decreased life expectancy as stand104
alone damages. There seems to be only one limitation to this new
theory of recovery: the patient’s increased risk of dying and
105
decreased life expectancy must be “substantial.” In establishing
loss of chance, the court reasoned the loss of chance of survival and
recovery is a real injury to a person, and prohibiting the cause of
action “‘fails to deter’ medical negligence because it immunizes
‘whole areas of medical malpractice from liability,’” namely
immunizing doctors from liability when a patient’s chance of
106
recovery is below fifty percent. Accordingly, the court concluded,
“a physician harms a patient by negligently depriving her of a
chance of recovery or survival and should be liable for the value of
107
that lost chance.”

102. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 331–33. Interestingly, because Justice Barry
Anderson and Justice Wright did not take part in the decision, the opinion
establishing loss of chance in Minnesota was decided by only a 3-2 decision. See id.
at 338.
103. Id. at 333.
104. Id. at 334 (“[W]e conclude that a physician harms a patient by
negligently depriving her of a chance of recovery or survival and should be liable
for the value of that lost chance.”).
105. Id. at 337 (noting that the court of appeals’ theory of causation is
unreasonable because a plaintiff whose odds of survival dropped slightly from fiftyone to forty-nine percent would have a recognized medical malpractice claim, but
a plaintiff whose odds of survival dropped from forty-nine to zero percent, as a
result of a physician’s negligence, would not be able to establish that the physician
caused any harm); see Bushnell, supra note 8, at 19 (“To be actionable, the
diminution of chance must be more than ‘token’ or ‘de minimis.’”); Alex Stein, A
Patient’s Decreased Chance to Survive or Recover Held Actionable as a Standalone Damage,
STEIN ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, http://steinmedicalmalpractice.com/dickhoff-v
-green-nw2d-2013-wl-2363550-minn-2013 (last visited April 21, 2014).
106. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d
819, 830 (Mass. 2008)).
107. Id. at 334.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court also provided guidance on how
108
to measure damages for a loss of chance claim. The court
explained that this determination includes a two-step process
109
where the lost chance is first measured and then valued. The
damages for a loss of chance analysis are “measured as ‘the
percentage probability by which the defendant’s tortious conduct
diminished the likelihood of achieving some more favorable
110
outcome.’” With respect to valuing that loss of chance, the court
noted that other jurisdictions that had recognized loss of chance as
a “distinct and compensable injury,” had “tended to adopt the
111
proportional-recovery approach.”
Under the proportional-recovery approach, a patient’s
damages for injury or death “are discounted by the value of the
112
chance that the physician’s negligence destroyed.”
In other
words, the total amount of damages recoverable “is equal to the
percentage chance of survival or cure lost, multiplied by the total
113
amount of damages allowable for the death or injury.”

108. See id. at 335–36. For an easy example of the ideas behind the loss of
chance doctrine outside the medical malpractice realm, see Chaplin v. Hicks,
[1911] 2 K.B. 786 (Eng.). In this case, the plaintiff entered into a contract to
compete for selection as one of twelve finalists in a pageant. If selected, the
plaintiff would have gained employment for three years on stage within the
theater. However, because the contest manager failed to notify the plaintiff that
she qualified for an interview, the plaintiff missed the interview and was not
selected as a finalist. The court explained that while each contestant had no better
than a twenty-five percent chance of winning, that chance was a viable legal
interest.
109. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 335.
110. Id. (quoting Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 839).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 336. The following is an example provided by the court in Dickhoff:
For example, assume that a physician negligently fails to diagnose
a patient’s cancer. The patient dies. If the patient had only a
40 percent chance of survival before the medical malpractice, but
the physician’s negligence reduced her chance of survival to
0 percent, then the physician should be liable for 40 percent of
the damages, or the portion of the value that the defendant’s
negligence destroyed. . . . If the fact-finder determines that total
damages for the patient’s death are $100,000, then the patient’s
loss of chance damages would be $40,000.
Id. at 336 n.15 (internal citation omitted).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/10

18

Biermann: The Practical Effects of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful Death Acti

2014]

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DICKHOFF V. GREEN

1561

In applying this formula to the present case, the court stated
that the appropriate baseline to determine the damages for
Jocelyn’s injury was to subtract the value of the reduction of
114
Jocelyn’s life expectancy from her pre-negligence life expectancy.
However, the court indicated this formula would have been altered
115
if Jocelyn had died from her illness. Ultimately, the court left it to
the fact-finder to determine the amount of damages necessary to
116
provide compensation for Jocelyn’s reduced life expectancy.
After setting out the general standard to be used in damage
calculations, the court analyzed whether Plaintiffs provided a
sufficient causal link between Jocelyn’s injury and defendants’
117
negligence. The court first considered the reasoning used by the
118
court of appeals. The court of appeals, relying on dicta from the
119
supreme court’s decision in MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
held that Plaintiffs “must prove only that Jocelyn’s chances of death
120
from her cancer moved from unlikely to likely.” However, the
supreme court rejected this approach and asserted that, “a plaintiff
must prove, among other things, that it is more probable than not
that his or her injury was a result of the defendant health care
121
provider’s negligence.”
It reasoned the court of appeals’
rationale must be abandoned because of its potentially “troubling
122
consequences” and instead held “a plaintiff must prove that the

114. Id. at 336 (citing Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 282–83 (Ind.
2000)).
115. Id. (“[U]nder our view of the loss of chance doctrine, the total amount of
damages recoverable is equal to the percentage chance of survival or cure lost,
multiplied by the total amount of damages allowable for the death or injury [of the
patient].” (emphasis added)). Though Jocelyn Dickhoff was alive for the entirety
of this case, sadly, she passed away on July 6, 2013, from her illness at the age of
seven. Randy Olson, Death Brings Change in Dickhoff Case, SAUK CENTRE HERALD
(July 12, 2013), http://www.saukherald.com/articles/2013/07/12/death-brings
-change-dickhoff-case.
116. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336.
117. See id. at 337–38.
118. Id. at 337.
119. 753 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2008).
120. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 337.
121. Id. (quoting Leubner v. Sterner, 493 N.W.2d 119, 121 (Minn. 1992)).
122. Id.
The troubling consequence of the court of appeals’ holding is that a
plaintiff whose odds of survival drop from 51 percent to 49 percent has
a cognizable medical malpractice claim, while a patient whose odds of
survival are reduced from 49 percent to 0 percent as a result of a
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defendant health care provider’s negligence more likely than not
123
caused the claimed injury.”
In this case, the supreme court concluded that Plaintiffs’
expert affidavits, which opined defendants’ failure to timely
diagnose Jocelyn’s cancer caused a substantial increase in the
likelihood that Jocelyn’s cancer would reoccur and decreased her
chances of survival by at least twenty percent, were sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact on the element of
124
causation. Consistent with its holdings establishing loss of chance
and causation, the court concluded a reasonable jury could find
that Jocelyn’s injury––the loss of chance of survival––was a result of
125
defendants’ negligence.
It ruled the district court erred by
granting summary judgment for Defendants and remanded the
126
case for trial.
V. THE OPTIONS: WHERE SHOULD MINNESOTA GO FROM HERE?
In the last three decades, twenty-two states and the District of
Columbia have adopted some form of the loss of chance
127
128
doctrine, nine states have declined to adopt the doctrine, and
129
nineteen states have not yet ruled on the issue. Among the states
that have adopted loss of chance into their jurisprudence, many
have already overcome the practical issues that Minnesota is now
facing, and these states provide valuable insight on Minnesota’s

physician’s negligence is unable to ever establish, as a matter of law,
that the physician caused any harm.
Id.
123. Id. (citing Leubner, 493 N.W.2d at 121; Smith v. Knowles, 281 N.W.2d 653,
656 (Minn. 1979)).
124. Id. at 338.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 334 n.12 (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23
(2008)).These states include Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Also included in the count is Minnesota.
128. Id. These states include Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont. Id.
129. See id. The states that have not yet ruled on the doctrine are Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Utah. See id.
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present quandary: how does a plaintiff bringing a loss of chance
claim surmount the legal barriers imposed by the wrongful death
statute? The following sections will address how the adoption of
loss of chance will affect medical malpractice claims. It will then
present various routes that other states have taken to address the
potentially prohibitive wrongful death statute.
A.

How Does the Loss of Chance Doctrine Affect a Claim for Medical
Malpractice?

The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Dickhoff, explained that to
establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice,
a plaintiff must prove, on the basis of expert medical
testimony, “(1) the standard of care recognized by the
medical community as applicable to the particular
defendant’s conduct, (2) that the defendant in fact
departed from that standard, and (3) that the defendant’s
departure from the130 standard was a direct cause of [the
patient’s] injuries.”
This standard is similar to the standard used in other states, the
main difference being that many states do not use the standard
common to the community to establish duty, and instead use a
131
However, using either
straightforward negligence approach.
method of recovery, a traditional medical malpractice claim
prevents recovery for plaintiffs whose chances of survival were less
132
than fifty-one percent before the defendant’s negligence. Over
the past two decades, courts have utilized the loss of chance
doctrine to correct this “all or nothing” approach and allow a
plaintiff to recover even if the plaintiff’s chances for survival were
133
less than fifty-one percent before the defendant’s negligence. It

130. Id. at 329 (quoting Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5
(Minn. 1982)).
131. In a medical malpractice suit, a plaintiff must prove the four elements of
negligence to recover: (1) the physician owed a duty of care to the patient; (2) the
physician breached this duty; (3) the breach actually caused the patient’s injury;
and (4) the patient suffered damages from the breach. See, e.g., Gooding v. Univ.
Hosp. Bldg. Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984); see also Robert A. Reisig, Jr.,
The Loss of A Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An Overview, 13 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 1163, 1164 (1990).
132. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 333 (arguing the “all or nothing” approach to
causation undermines the fundamental aims of tort law and instead immunizes
entire areas of medical malpractice from liability).
133. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
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134

was argued, and the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to accept,
that the proportional damages approach to loss of chance allows
damages to be awarded in direct proportion to the harm caused,
135
while preserving the traditional principles of causation.
B.

The Damages Available Under Loss of Chance and Wrongful Death
Statutes

While on its face the loss of chance doctrine seems like a fairly
straightforward answer to a lingering policy question in the medical
malpractice arena, courts in many jurisdictions have struggled with
its practical applications. One of the central questions presented in
Minnesota is how the doctrine will affect wrongful death claims and
the future of the wrongful death statute. It can be argued that
wrongful death statutes, which are designed to compensate
136
survivors for the loss of a loved one, are at odds with loss of
chance and could actually prevent recovery. This is because most
wrongful death statutes require a showing that the defendant’s
137
negligent act or omission “caused” the plaintiff’s death.
A
wrongful death statute allows for recovery when the defendant
caused the death of the decedent and compensates survivors for their
138
loss, while loss of chance allows for recovery when the defendant

Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353,
1377–78 (1981) (describing how the all or nothing approach to causation weakens
the compensatory, risk spreading, and deterrence objectives of tort law);
cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (listing the purposes for
awarding tort damages, including deterrence).
134. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 335–37.
135. See, e.g., Mead v. Adrian, 670 N.W.2d 174, 188 (Iowa 2003) (Cady, J.,
concurring); Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 840 (Mass. 2008); Roberts
v. Ohio Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484 (Ohio 1996). See
generally Stephen F. Brennwald, Proving Causation in “Loss of a Chance” Cases: A
Proportional Approach, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 754 (1985). The traditional
standards of causation are maintained because the injury complained of is the lost
chance of survival. This means the causation question is: But-for the defendant’s
negligent treatment or diagnosis, would the plaintiff have suffered the lost chance
of survival?
136. 27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68, § 13.13.
137. Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–88; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 573.02
(2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
138. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (“When death is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of any person or corporation, the trustee appointed as provided in
subdivision 3 may maintain an action therefor . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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caused the lost chance and does not compensate the survivors for their
139
loss. Instead, the focus of a loss of chance claim is on the
decedent––on the loss he or she suffered before death.
C.

What Have Other States Done?
1.

Decisive Legislative Action

In two states where the high courts have endorsed loss of
140
141
chance, Michigan and South Dakota, the legislature stepped in
142
and extinguished a plaintiff’s right to recover under the doctrine.
In Michigan, after the court established the loss of chance cause of
action, the legislature responded by altering a plaintiff’s recovery
143
under a loss of chance theory. Similarly, after South Dakota’s
high court adopted loss of chance, the legislature abrogated the
decision. The statute directly states:
The Legislature finds that in those actions founded upon
an alleged want of ordinary care or skill the conduct of
the responsible party must be shown to have been the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. The
Legislature also finds that the application of the so called
loss of chance doctrine in such cases improperly alters or
eliminates the requirement of proximate causation.

139. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 337–38.
140. See Falcon v. Mem’l Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 443, 461–62 (Mich. 1990)
(recognizing loss of chance doctrine), superseded by statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2912a, as recognized in O’Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 487 Mich. 485
(Mich. 2010).
141. See Jorgenson v. Vener, 640 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 2002) (establishing loss of
chance doctrine).
142. For Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a(2) (West, Westlaw
through 2014 Reg. Sess.) (stating in a medical malpractice action plaintiff cannot
recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or an opportunity to achieve a better
result unless the opportunity was greater than fifty percent); see also Weymers v.
Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 650 (Mich. 1997) (holding that Michigan “does not
recognize a cause of action for the loss of an opportunity to avoid physical harm
less than death”). For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 20-9-1.1, 1.2 (2013)
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.) (abrogating the holding in Jorgenson and
declaring the application of loss of chance “improperly alters or eliminates the
requirement of proximate causation”).
143. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912a(2) (Westlaw) (limiting loss of chance
claims to plaintiffs who had a greater than fifty percent opportunity of surviving
his or her illness).
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Therefore, the rule in Jorgenson v. Vener, 2000 SD 87,
144
616 N.W. 2d 366 (2000) is hereby abrogated.
In other words, though the high courts in these states chose to
adopt loss of chance, the legislature abrogated the rulings due to
the weighty public policy concerns associated with the doctrine’s
145
establishment. Conversely, in California and Maryland, the courts
have declined to adopt loss of chance because the policy concerns
at issue were deemed to be better suited for legislative debate and
146
action. It does not appear, however, that any other states have
taken similar legislative recourse after the imposition of loss of
chance within their borders.
2.

Circumventing the Wrongful Death Statute

The defense bar may assert Minnesota’s wrongful death statute
does not apply to loss of chance actions based on the statutory
interpretation of Minnesota Statutes section 573.02. As explained
in Part III of this note, the statute states “[w]hen death is caused by
the wrongful act or omission of any person . . . the trustee . . . may
maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained
an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the
147
wrongful act or omission.” Because the decedent’s death was not
caused by the defendant-doctor’s negligence but rather was caused
by the decedent’s underlying disease, the defense bar may argue
the wrongful death statute is not applicable and the patient’s next
148
of kin is foreclosed from bringing a loss of chance claim.

144. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-9-1.1 (Westlaw).
145. See id. (stating concerns about implications on proximate causation).
146. Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1608 (1991); Fennell v. S. Md.
Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 520 A.2d 206, 214–15 (Md. 1990); see Shively v. Klein, 551 A.2d 41,
44 (Del. 1998) (noting that given the drastic change in traditional proof the
establishment of loss of chance is best left to the legislature).
147. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012) (emphasis added).
148. See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 835 (Mass. 2008)
(defendant made the same argument). The Massachusetts wrongful death statute
is similarly worded to the Minnesota wrongful death statute in that they both
require the defendant to “cause the death of the person.” Compare MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 38 of the 2014 2nd Ann. Sess.), with
MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012). The defense in Matsuyama argued that the language
of the statute—“causes the death”—precludes loss of chance claims and “allows
only claims that the defendant was a but-for cause of the decedent’s death.”
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835. The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected this
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However, adopting this restrictive interpretation would draw
an arbitrary line between plaintiffs who survive their illnesses and
plaintiffs who die during trial or prior to filing suit. Drawing this
distinction between plaintiffs could render the loss of chance
doctrine all but meaningless. For example, in Dickhoff, the patient,
Jocelyn, was able to survive the legal proceedings and recover
149
against her doctor for failing to properly diagnose her disease.
However, not even two months after the Minnesota Supreme Court
issued its decision on her case, Jocelyn tragically passed away from
150
her disease. Because the injury in this action is the loss of chance
to live, it is an unfortunate guarantee that many plaintiffs with
viable claims would be foreclosed from bringing an action simply
because they died before the action could be brought, or before
the action concluded, unless they are allowed to bring a claim via
the wrongful death statute. If Jocelyn had passed away at the end of
May, instead of the beginning of July, her parents would have had
to convert her claim into a wrongful death action. Therefore, if the
argument presented in this section is accepted, Jocelyn’s parents
would have been foreclosed from asserting her loss of chance claim
via the wrongful death statute, and Jocelyn’s action would have
been dismissed without recovery upon her death.
The practical implications of this type of ruling would be
unjust and far reaching. Patients with viable loss of chance claims
may not bring a claim if their health is uncertain, because if they
were to die prior to the case being resolved, their case would be
dismissed and would not be converted into a wrongful death claim
151
for the benefit of their next of kin. Furthermore, practically
speaking, attorneys would be hesitant to represent plaintiffs for loss
of chance claims because, given the nature of the cause of action,
most, if not all, of these plaintiffs would have uncertain health
conditions, and an attorney would not want to pursue a claim that
could be dismissed if the plaintiff dies during the trial. Overall,
while a resolution by this type of statutory interpretation may be an
attractive bright-line rule at first glance, Minnesota courts should
152
reject it for the policy reasons expressed above.
argument and stated this interpretation was not required by the wrongful death
statute. Id.
149. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 338 (Minn. 2013).
150. Olson, supra note 115.
151. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subdiv. 1.
152. In addition, it is arguable, based on common sense, that if the Minnesota
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Amending or Interpreting the Wrongful Death Statute: The
Massachusetts Approach

To allow plaintiffs to bring a loss of chance claim under
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute, the legislature could amend
the existing wrongful death statute to explicitly allow the loss of
chance of survival. Or, the court may choose to interpret the
153
wrongful death statute as encompassing loss of chance claims.
Under this approach, the language allowing recovery when the
defendant negligently caused the death of another would be
interpreted as incorporating another meaning: the defendant will
be deemed to have negligently caused the death of another
whenever he or she causes a reduction in a person’s chance of
154
survival. An example of this type of solution is the Massachusetts
155
high court’s decision in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum.
In Matsuyama, the court directly addressed the issue of
whether Massachusetts’s wrongful death statute precluded loss of
chance and decided the statute only sets forth procedural
requirements on recovery, while the common law wrongful death
doctrine provides the actual right to recovery and has evolved to
156
encompass loss of chance. Specifically, the court held that as
medical science has progressed and developed methods that are
able to quantify

Supreme Court established the loss of chance doctrine, the court did so because it
wanted to provide plaintiffs with the cause of action. The court did not establish
the cause of action, so it could be rendered meaningless through statutory
interpretation.
153. See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 838 (interpreting the Massachusetts
wrongful death statute to allow for loss of chance claims though the claim is not
authorized by the express wording of the statute).
154. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 487
(Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (interpreting the wrongful death statute at
issue to incorporate a loss of chance claim and allow for recovery).
155. 890 N.E.2d 819.
156. Id. at 838; see, e.g., Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972)
(allowing plaintiff to bring a claim under the wrongful death statute where the
language of the statute did not provide plaintiff with a right to recover but the
wrongful death statute was interpreted to provide only the procedural
requirements). But see Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice:
The Need for Caution, 87 MASS. L. REV. 3, 16–17 (2002) (contending the
Massachusetts wrongful death statute is “fundamentally inconsistent” with loss of
chance doctrine).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss4/10

26

Biermann: The Practical Effects of Dickhoff v. Green on Wrongful Death Acti

2014]

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DICKHOFF V. GREEN

1569

the extent to which malpractice damaged the patient’s
prospects for survival, and in light of the strong public
policy favoring compensation for victims of medical
malpractice and the deterrence of deviations from
appropriate standards of care, loss of chance of survival
rightly assumes a place in our common law of wrongful
157
death . . . .
Though the Massachusetts wrongful death statute and the loss of
chance doctrine were arguably in conflict, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court interpreted the statute to implicitly incorporate a
loss of chance claim because “claims for loss of chance . . . are
sufficiently akin to wrongful death claims as to be cognizable under
158
the wrongful death statute.”
Massachusetts’s and Minnesota’s wrongful death statutes are
similarly worded as both require a defendant’s negligence or
conduct to “cause[] the death of a person” in order to bring a
159
wrongful death action. The states also took similar paths in
creating their wrongful death statutes. Massachusetts, during
colonial times, allowed for wrongful death claims at common law,
160
but like Minnesota, after Baker v. Bolton was decided in 1808, it
embraced the holding that no cause of action for wrongful death
161
existed apart from statute. However, in Gaudette v. Webb, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court acknowledged there was a common
law wrongful death action, and held that the wrongful death statute
merely provided the procedural requirements to bring such a
162
claim.
On the other hand, Minnesota has never explicitly
acknowledged the existence of a common law wrongful death
157. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 837–38.
158. Id. at 837.
159. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (2013) (West, Westlaw through
Ch. 38 of the 2014 2nd Ann. Sess.) (imposing liability on anyone who “by his
negligence causes the death of a person”), with MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2012)
(“When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person . . . the
trustee appointed . . . may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have
maintained an action, had the decedent lived, for an injury caused by the wrongful
act or omission.”).
160. See supra Part II.A. (explaining the significance of Baker v. Bolton on U.S.
law).
161. See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835–36; supra Part II; see, e.g., Carey v.
Berkshire R.R., 55 Mass. 475 (1848) (holding the death of a person is not proper
grounds for an action for damages).
162. 284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972).
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action, and has always held the cause of action was a creature of
163
statute.
Despite these differences, Minnesota could still follow a similar
path, and interpret its wrongful death statute to implicitly
incorporate a loss of chance claim, because the two claims are
164
“sufficiently akin” to one another. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found the Matsuyama opinion very persuasive, as evidenced by its
165
heavy reliance on the opinion throughout its analysis in Dickhoff.
In addition, for practical reasons, this could be the best route for
Minnesota courts to take, because it would avoid drawing an
166
arbitrary line between plaintiffs and would be a relatively “easy”
167
solution compared to a legislative amendment of the statute.
Once the courts have interpreted loss of chance as properly
falling within the ambit of the wrongful death statute, the courts
could decide loss of chance would be best settled as a matter of
fault apportionment. For example, on the special verdict form the
court could ask the jury to determine whether the physician was
negligent in his or her diagnosis or treatment of the decedent. If
answered in the affirmative, the next question would be what share
of the fault the physician bore for the decedent’s death. This would

163. See supra Part II.
164. See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 837.
165. See Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013)
(citing to the Matsuyama decision twelve times as the court explained the loss of
chance doctrine and its implications).
166. The arbitrary line would be drawn between plaintiffs who have suffered a
loss of chance of survival but live long enough to bring the action to completion,
and plaintiffs who suffered a loss of chance of survival but unfortunately do not
survive their illnesses long enough to bring a claim or do not survive the trial.
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision in Dickhoff on certain
policy rationales––namely, that it was harsh and arbitrary to draw a line between
plaintiffs with a pre-negligence chance of survival of fifty-one percent (who were
able to recover full damages) and plaintiffs with a pre-negligence chance of
survival of forty-nine percent or lower (who were denied a loss of chance
recovery)––it does not seem likely that the court would draw another arbitrary line
in the application of the loss of chance doctrine.
167. It would be easy in the sense that the court must simply interpret the
words of the legislature in the wrongful death statute, and it would not require the
legislature to embark on the process of amending the statute. Additionally, if the
legislature did not intend to incorporate the loss of chance claims in the wrongful
death statute, it could amend the wrongful death statute and overturn the court’s
ruling. This would be similar to what the Michigan and South Dakota legislatures
did after the high court established loss of chance.
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be compared to the portion of the ‘fault’ attributable to the
underlying disease running its natural course––which would
amount to the percentage of fault attributable to the defendant in
168
the loss of chance claim. This process would be a fairly effortless
way of incorporating the loss of chance doctrine within Minnesota’s
169
existing framework.
4.

Survivorship Actions: The Missouri Approach

There are meritorious arguments suggesting the Minnesota
Legislature could adopt a survival statute, which would allow for a
survivorship action to be brought by family members of the
decedent. This would create a distinction between a traditional
170
wrongful death claim and recovery under loss of chance. The
wrongful death claims would be left for the specific instances where
a survivor is recovering for his or her own loss (and not the
171
decedent’s loss). A good example of how this would function is
set out by Missouri’s approach to loss of chance.
The Supreme Court of Missouri adopted the loss of chance
172
doctrine in Wollen v. DePaul Health Center. In Wollen, the plaintiff
brought a wrongful death action in accordance with Missouri’s
173
wrongful death statute and argued her husband would not have
passed away if he had been correctly diagnosed and given the
174
appropriate treatment. Specifically, the plaintiff contended if the
defendants would have properly diagnosed and treated the
decedent, he would have “‘had a thirty percent chance . . . of
175
survival and cure.’”

168. This suggested framework for apportionment parallels the existing jury
instructions for negligence and comparative fault. See, e.g., 4 STEENSON & KNAPP,
supra note 2, § 28.90. See also Mahoney v. Podolnick, 773 A.2d 1102, 1103–04 (N.J.
2001) (comparing the doctor’s fault to the “fault” of the underlying disease in a
loss of chance claim).
169. Id.
170. See Jones v. Wittenberg Univ., 534 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1976) (applying
Ohio law).
171. Id.
172. Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Mo. 1992).
173. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (West, Westlaw through 2014 2nd Reg.
Sess.).
174. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 682.
175. Id.
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The court concluded that a patient suffers harm when a doctor
fails to diagnose or adequately treat a serious injury or disease; just
as the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in Dickhoff, this loss of
176
chance of recovery is a separately compensable harm. Also like
Minnesota, the Missouri court adopted a proportional damage
177
calculation. Despite recognizing and adopting a recovery based
on loss of chance, the Missouri Supreme Court remanded the
plaintiff’s case back to the trial court so that the plaintiff could
178
amend her petition and sue under the state’s survivorship statute
179
instead of the wrongful death statute. The court explained the
fundamental difference between the two statutes is that the
“survivorship statute applies when the injury alleged did not cause
death, and the wrongful death statute applies when the injury did
180
cause death.”
In other words, to bring an action under the wrongful death
statute, the plaintiff must be able to prove the death of the
181
decedent was the result of the negligence of the tortfeasors. In a
loss of chance claim, the plaintiff must rely on the patient’s
statistical chance of recovery in making his or her claim, and argue
this chance would not have been lost if the defendant would have
182
properly diagnosed the patient. However, it cannot be argued
based on this statistical measurement that the decedent would have
183
survived had he or she been properly diagnosed. This cannot be
argued because the plaintiff is not armed with this information,
and even if there is medical certainty regarding the chance that the
patient would have survived his or her injuries, this does not inform

176. Id. at 684. In an interesting analogy, the Missouri Supreme Court
described the harm in a loss of chance action as being similar to a scenario where
a person was forced to choose between three unmarked doors, two of which
contained death and the last containing life. Id. A doctor “who deprived a patient
of this opportunity [to choose], even though only a one-third chance, would have
caused her real harm.” Id.
177. Id. at 684 n.2. Missouri instructs the jury to find the value of the lost life
and in a percentage measurement, the exact chance of recovery lost. The court
takes these numbers and multiplies them together to determine the net value of
the damage award.
178. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020 (2013) (Westlaw).
179. Id. § 537.080 (Westlaw); Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685.
180. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685.
181. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (Westlaw); Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685.
182. Wollen, 828 S.W.2d at 685.
183. Id.
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the court whether this particular patient died (or will die) as a
184
result of the defendant’s negligence. Therefore, it is impossible
to prove the decedent’s death resulted from the defendant’s failure
to properly diagnose and treat, and the plaintiff is precluded from
185
bringing an action under the wrongful death statute.
Instead, the plaintiff is able to bring a claim under Missouri’s
survivorship statute, which states:
Causes of action for personal injuries, other than those
resulting in death, whether such injuries be to the health
or to the person of the injured party, shall not abate by
reason of his death . . . such a cause of action shall survive
to the personal representative of such injured party, and
against the person . . . liable for such injuries . . . and the
measure of damages shall be the same as if such death or
186
deaths had not occurred.
This provision allows the personal representative to bring a loss of
chance claim under the same statute regardless of whether the
187
patient ultimately dies from his or her disease. Because the
measure of damages is the same whether the patient is alive or
dead, all patients seeking to recover under loss of chance can
receive the same recovery, and their actions do not have to be
188
transitioned into wrongful death claims upon the patient’s death.
Missouri’s survivorship statute stands in stark contrast to the
Minnesota wrongful death statute because the latter draws a bright
dividing line between wrongful death actions and personal injury
claims, and it allows for the recovery of different types of damages
depending on whether the plaintiff dies during the cause of
189
action. In fact, under the present circumstances in Minnesota, a
patient who brings a loss of chance claim against a defendant likely
could collect damages for pain and suffering, past and future
economic loss, and past and future medical expenses that were the

184. Id. at 685–86.
185. Id. at 686.
186. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.020(1) (Westlaw).
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Tiedeken v. Tiedeken, 363 N.W.2d 909, 910–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn.
1982)) (“A wrongful death claim, unlike a claim for personal injuries does not
include compensation for pain and suffering.”); 27 STEENSON ET AL., supra note 68,
§ 13.13.
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result of the physician’s negligence. In contrast, if the patient dies
during the process of his or her claim, the action must be
converted into a wrongful death action, the damages available for
the same claim would be limited to the pecuniary loss suffered by
the next of kin from the patient’s death, and damages such as pain
190
and suffering would be uncollectible.
Missouri’s use of a
survivorship statute to complement its wrongful death claim
seamlessly introduces loss of chance into Missouri law and does not
create the same inconsistencies that are currently present with the
Minnesota wrongful death statute alone.
VI. PREDICTIONS FOR MINNESOTA
In the wake of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in
Dickhoff, the State has many options regarding how it will introduce
loss of chance into its existing legal framework. As presented by
191
192
Part V, the legislature could abrogate or amend the wrongful
death statute to bring harmony between the loss of chance doctrine
and the wrongful death statute. The courts could interpret the loss
of chance doctrine as falling within the ambit of the wrongful
193
death statute or interpret the statute as limiting the loss of chance

190. Outside of Missouri, many other states allow the next of kin to recover
for a decedent’s pain and suffering. See, e.g., Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173
(7th Cir. 1985) (applying federal common law); Rewis v. United States, 536
F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying New Mexico law); Williams v. Bay Hosp., 471
So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (illustrating Florida has survivorship actions
similar to those in Missouri that allow for pain and suffering damages to be
collected by next of kin); Mahoney v. Podolnick, 773 A.2d 1102, 1103–04 (N.J.
2001) (awarding $50,000 for decedent’s pain and suffering in a loss of chance
claim); Barenbrugge v. Rich, 490 N.E.2d 1368, 1374–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(finding the jury could consider the suffering of a decedent who died during the
course of a loss of chance trial); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., 741 P.2d 467,
476 n.26 (Okla. 1987) (holding in a loss of chance action the next of kin can
recover for a decedent’s “mental pain and anguish”). Additionally, some states
have survivor statutes that allow an injured party’s claim to survive even after the
injured plaintiff has died. See, e.g., Gauthe v. Asbestos Corp., 97-656 (La. App. 5
Cir. 11/25/97), 703 So. 2d 763 (recognizing both survival actions, which are
ordinary tort actions filed directly by injured party, and wrongful death actions,
which are tort actions filed by survivors of deceased injured party for their own
pain and suffering as result of death).
191. See supra Part V.D.1.
192. See supra Part V.D.3.
193. See supra Part V.D.3.
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doctrine to living plaintiffs, thus avoiding the issue altogether. Or
even further still, the legislature could model its jurisprudence
after Missouri and adopt a survivorship statute to complement the
195
existing wrongful death statute.
Given the long history of
Minnesota’s wrongful death statute and the court’s lack of clear
direction on the issue in Dickhoff, there is no easy answer.
However, despite the lack of clarity about what will transpire in
Minnesota, the supreme court was supportive of allowing loss of
196
chance claims to proceed via the wrongful death statute. In
Dickhoff, the court stated, “under our view of the loss of chance
doctrine, the total amount of damages recoverable is equal to the
percentage chance of survival or cure lost, multiplied by the total
amount of damages allowable for the death or injury [of the
197
patient].” By discussing loss of chance in the express context of
death, it is evident the court envisioned the loss of chance doctrine
to apply to patients equally, regardless of whether they ultimately
198
survived their condition. From this it can be inferred that the
court intended to allow loss of chance claims to be brought via the
wrongful death statute, because the statute is the sole avenue
available to parties bringing claims on behalf of a deceased
199
person. This decreases the options available to Minnesota, so the
most feasible option would be for the court to adopt the
Massachusetts approach in resolving the conflict between the
wrongful death statute and the loss of chance doctrine.
Alternatively, while less feasible, the better option would be for the
Minnesota Legislature to amend the wrongful death statute and
create clear parameters for the new doctrine and the traditional
wrongful death action.
It is feasible for the supreme court to adopt the Massachusetts
approach, because the court seemed amenable to the Massachusetts resolution as it was presented in Matsuyama. In fact, the
court was so persuaded by the reasoning of this decision that it

194. See supra Part V.D.2.
195. See supra Part V.D.4.
196. Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321, 336 (Minn. 2013).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. See id.
199. MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2012) (“A cause of action arising out of an injury
to the person dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as
provided in section 573.02.”).
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relied on the case to establish loss of chance in Minnesota. Given
this reliance, it would make sense that the court would further rely
on Matsuyama when it determines how to fit the loss of chance
doctrine into the Minnesota law.
The basic tension between the wrongful death statute and the
201
loss of chance doctrine is causation. Wrongful death plaintiffs
phrase their complaints in terms of causation of death because this
202
is mandated by statute to bring a claim. However, in a loss of
chance claim a plaintiff is not trying to recover for wrongful death,
203
but rather for a family member’s loss of chance to avoid death. In
response to this problem, Judge Pearson of the Washington
Supreme Court explained that he would interpret the wrongful
death statute as being applicable to loss of chance cases because of
204
the vague meaning of the word “cause.” A person would be found
to have “caused” another’s death “whenever he cause[d] a
205
substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”
In addition to the imprecise meaning of causation, it is feasible
that the courts will interpret the wrongful death statute as allowing
a loss of chance claim to be brought via the statute because of the
strong policy reasons underlying the loss of chance doctrine. In
Dickhoff, the court determined recognizing loss of chance as a
compensable injury will advance the fundamental principles of tort
206
law: deterrence and compensation.
If the court was not
compelled by these underlying policy rationales, it would not have
established loss of chance in Dickhoff, and would have instead
reasserted its holding in Fabio. Its interpretation of the wrongful
death statute as encompassing loss of chance would further these

200. See Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 329–37 (citing to the Matsuyama decision
twelve times as the court was explaining the loss of chance doctrine and its
implications).
201. See supra Part V.C.
202. See MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (requiring death be caused by actor’s
negligence).
203. Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–87; see Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336.
204. Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 487 n.1 (Wash. 1983)
(Pearson, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 487.
206. Dickhoff, 836 N.W.2d at 336; see also Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 42
(Minn. 1992) (“Tort liability seeks to compensate the injured and to deter
wrongdoing.”).
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policy initiatives by allowing a greater number of plaintiffs to bring
207
an action.
However, it could be argued that this method is unattractive
because the court cannot cleanly interpret into the statute what is
not mentioned, and this, arguably, would be an infringement on
the power of the legislature. However, courts are permitted to
interpret statutes, and the Minnesota courts have interpreted state
208
statutes on many occasions in the past.
Furthermore, it is
important to recognize that there is a procedural safeguard given
209
to the legislature in these circumstances––amendment power. If
the legislature believes the court erred in interpreting the wrongful
death statute as authorizing loss of chance claims, the legislature is
210
free to amend the statute to reflect its actual intent. Overall,
given the relative ease of the method and the court’s reliance on
Massachusetts’ law in establishing loss of chance, it makes sense
that the court would follow Matsuyama’s lead and interpret the
wrongful death statute as allowing loss of chance claims.
While the interpretation method provided by Matsuyama
seems to be the most feasible method of incorporating loss of
chance into Minnesota jurisprudence, it may not be the best

207. However, see Bushnell, supra note 8, at 21, for an argument that an
increased number of claims may be disadvantageous to consumers.
208. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2012) (providing factors for the court to
consider when interpreting a statute); State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 158–59
(Minn. 2004) (stating a court can interpret a statute when it is ambiguous or
subject to more than one reasonable meaning); see, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. v.
Bjelland, 710 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. 2006) (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 176.061 to hold
a workers compensation insurer’s recovery was limited to wrongful death
damages); Tolerton & Stetson Co. v. Ferguson, 84 Minn. 497, 88 N.W. 19 (1901)
(interpreting statute regarding service of process for corporations).
209. How a Bill Becomes Law in Minnesota, MINN. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://
www.leg.state.mn.us/leg/howbill.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (providing that
amendments are adopted through a majority vote by the Minnesota Legislature).
210. Compare Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990) (barring
product defect claims by commercial buyers under any circumstances except
where the buyer could show personal injury), with Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 352, § 2,
1991 Minn. Laws 2792, 2792–93 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 604.10) (overturning
Hapka and restoring the common law economic loss rule). See generally Daniel S.
Kleinberger et al., Building a New Foundation: Torts, Contracts, and the Economic Loss
Doctrine, BENCH & B. MINN. (Sept. 2000), http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar
/2000/sep00/econ-loss.htm (explaining the back and forth between the
Minnesota Legislature and Minnesota Supreme Court in constructing the
economic loss doctrine).
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method. A cleaner and more effective way of incorporating the
doctrine would be for the legislature to amend the wrongful death
211
statute to reflect the inclusion of loss of chance. This would allow
a loss of chance plaintiff to receive a full recovery without drawing
arbitrary lines based on the plaintiff surviving his or her cause of
212
action. It would also bring a greater degree of clarity to the law,
because the court would not simply be interpreting loss of chance
as fitting into the causation element of the wrongful death statute.
Instead, a plaintiff would have a distinct cause of action with clearly
defined rules and boundaries.
The amendment process would also provide the legislature
with the opportunity to update Minnesota’s wrongful death statute.
As it stands, Minnesota’s wrongful death statute still bears the
historical influences of the common law rule, which banned next of
kin from bringing a wrongful death action. Minnesota’s statute is
an outlier in the way it is worded, because it expressly states that all
causes of action die with the decedent unless explicitly saved by
213
statute.
Instead of incorporating language extinguishing all
claims at death, most states favor a construction that more closely
214
resembles Lord Campbell’s Act. A good example of this type of
statute is South Carolina’s wrongful death statute, which states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the
wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act,
neglect or default is such as would, if death had not
ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person
who would have been liable, if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding
215
the death of the person injured . . . .
While Minnesota Statute section 573.02 incorporates similar
language to that of South Carolina and other such states, it
nevertheless is couched in the initial premise that all actions die
with the decedent unless otherwise “brought back to life” by
statute. This presents an extra layer of difficulty when trying to
interpret new causes of action into the existing statutory framework

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See supra Part V.D.3.
See supra Part V.D.2.
MINN. STAT. § 573.01.
Brennwald, supra note 135, at 786–87.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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and could be improved by more closely mirroring Lord Campbell’s
216
Act or by adopting a survivorship statute.
Overall, the best response to the adoption of loss of chance
claims in Minnesota would be for the legislature to amend the
wrongful death statute to provide for the loss of chance doctrine.
This could just be a minor wording change, but it would allow a
seamless introduction of loss of chance into the existing legal
framework, eliminate inconsistencies and arbitrary line drawing,
dispel the mysteries regarding how loss of chance should be
applied, and would allow plaintiffs to seek a full recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
In Dickhoff, the court established loss of chance and, by
holding that a patient can recover when a physician’s negligence
causes a reduction in the patient’s chances to survive or recover
from his or her illness, introduced a host of questions in its wake.
Among these questions is whether a loss of chance claim can be
brought via the wrongful death statute, or whether a decedent’s
claim is permanently extinguished. The most feasible way for the
court to answer this question would be to adopt the reasoning set
out in Matsuyama and allow loss of chance claims to be brought via
the wrongful death statute through a broad interpretation of the
statute. However, because Minnesota appears to be an outlier in
the way its wrongful death statute is worded, the best method in
responding to the loss of chance doctrine is an amendment to the
existing wrongful death statute. The legislature, through an
amendment, could ensure loss of chance plaintiffs would be able to
(1) obtain contingency-fee legal counsel, and (2) have clear
parameters within which to bring a claim for relief.

216. See supra Part V.D.4. The adoption of a survivorship statute would
eliminate the need for future interpretation of the wrongful death statute in this
context, and in some ways would draw cleaner lines for a loss of chance claim,
because the action would not have to be converted upon the plaintiff’s death.
Rather, under a survivorship statute, the same action could be brought by the
patient (or the patient’s estate), and Minnesota would not have to try to fit loss of
chance within the parameters of a wrongful death claim. Id.
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